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Deferral of Employee Rights to Arbitration:
An Evolving Dichotomy by the
Burger Court?
by CHRISTIANE HYDE CITRoN*
THE resolution of grievances by arbitration is the cornerstone of
modern labor relations law. Final and binding arbitration appears as a
remedy for possible labor disputes in 94 percent of the collective bargain-
ing agreements in the United States.' While fostering the arbitral process,
federal courts during the last decade frequently have attempted to define
the precise scope of the powers of arbitrators in light of jurisdiction by
the courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board).
Despite arbitration's primary role in the resolution of labor disputes, its
relationship to other judicial and administrative mechanisms for settling
grievances has remained unclear. Irreconcilable decisions in the courts
of appeals on these issues have furthered the confusion.
Finally, in 1974, the Supreme Court greatly clarified the issues,
although several questions remain unanswered. The Court delineated
the impact of arbitration on the specific rights and remedies conferred
by two statutes: the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 19692
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).3 The result of
its decisions in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW4 and Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co." is an apparent inconsistency. In the Court's review of those
cases greater deference was accorded to the arbitrator's decision in the
occupational safety case than to the decision in the discrimination
action.6
* B.A., 1971, Yale University; J.D., 1975, New York University.
1. Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Employment: A Comparative
Evaluation of Forums, 46 U. WAsH. L. REv. 455, 483 (1971).
2. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1970 & Supp. I, 1973).
4. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
5. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
6. The statutory interests involved in the two cases are distinguishable. The Coal
Mine Act did not create substantive individual rights, while the major thrust of the Civil
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The Court's refusal, in Alexander, to preclude a complainant from
pursuing judicial remedies after a purportedly final arbitration dimin-
ished the arbitrator's role in racial discrimination actions.7 In effect, the
Court rejected the so-called "Rios criteria," a development of the Fifth
Circuit which encouraged judicial deference to an arbitrator's decision
in race discrimination cases," and which many considered the sensible
integration of arbitral and judicial enforcement of civil rights.9
Until this term, the Court had adopted a policy of deferral to
arbitration decisions.'" In this light, Alexander's restrictive approach is
best understood as another example of the Court's unique treatment of
Rights Act was to create these personal rights. For a discussion of whether what is
true here of grievances involving race discrimination is also true of sex discrimination,
see note 111 infra.
7. 415 U.S. at 55-60.
8. Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972).
9. The theory of preclusion by arbitration has been rejected by those who argue
that Title VII rights may be relitigated in federal district court after adverse arbitration
decisions. See, e.g., Bennett & Bennett, Labor Law Meets Title VII, 6 CONN. L. REV.
66, 73 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bennett & Bennett]; Gosseen, Labor Relations Law
1972/73 ANN. SUR. AM. L. 445, 459 [hereinafter cited as Gosseen]; Hebert & Reischel,
Title VII and the Multiple Approaches to Eliminating Employment Discrimination, 46
N.Y.U.L. REV. 449, 468-71 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hebert & Reischel].
10. The Supreme Court's policy of promoting arbitral resolution of labor griev-
ances has scanty statutory support. It began in 1957, when the Court declared that sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) conferred jurisdiction upon
the federal courts to create a federal labor law and that with this mandate the courts
should enforce collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate grievances. Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) construing Labor Management Relations
Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). The Court's elevation of arbitration to a position
as the preferred means of grievance resolution, (with minimal basis in explicit statutory
wording) was completed in the Steelworkers Trilogy: United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960). Justice Douglas's three opinions created a presumption, absent an ex-
press exclusion, of arbitrability of grievances. '"In the absence of any express provision
excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evi-
dence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where,
as here, the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad. Since any
attempt by a court to infer such a purpose necessarily comprehends the merits, the court
should view with suspicion an attempt to persuade it to become entangled in the con-
struction of the substantive provisions of a labor agreement .... ." United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85. With unqualified praise for
the competence and expertise of the arbitrator, the Court established a rule of judicial
deference to arbitral determinations: "[T]he question of interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction
which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction
of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation
of the contract is different from his." Id. at 599.
A similar policy of deference to arbitration had been adopted earlier by the Na-
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labor grievances founded on race discrimination," which it distinguishes
from grievances about general terms and conditions of employment. The
decision in Alexander is but one instance of the particularized approach
that the Court has taken over the past thirty years to the different
elements of the employment relation controlled by different statutes.
It should therefore come as no surprise to labor law analysts that
even in the ambit of a federal labor law favoring arbitration, employee
grievances involving alleged racial discrimination should continue to be
singled out for preferred status. The extent of this favored status,
however, is difficult to determine. This article explores the scope of the
power the Supreme Court has given arbitrators, focusing on the reasons
behind the variation in the effect given to arbitration in the context of
the different rights at issue.
tional Labor Relations Board. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
In order to promote the use of arbitration, the Board announced it would respect
an arbitrator's award and would not reconsider the merits of a dispute when "[t]he
proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound,
and the decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and
policies of the act." Id. at 1082.
11. The traditional remedy for the employee who is dissatisfied with his union's
prosecution of his grievance is to sue the union for breach of its duty of fair represen-
tation under the collective bargaining agreement. See text accompanying notes 90-95
infra. See also Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration,
37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 362 (1962); Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under La-
bor Contracts, 73 YALE LJ. 1215 (1964). This duty of fair representation was first
articulated by the Court in 1944 in a discussion of the Railway Labor Act. The Court
reasoned that exclusive representation would present equal protection problems unless it
carried a concommitant obligation to represent the interest of the minority fairly. Steele
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944) construing Railway Labor Act,
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1970). In a companion case, the Court extended the duty to
unions operating under the NLRA. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56
(1944). Violation of this duty of representation may also be an unfair labor practice.
Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
Nevertheless, the realities of presenting a labor grievance operate to negate effective
protection of the individual when his interests are contrary to those of his union. The
union, rather than the individual employee, controls the manner of presentation of the
grievance in the arbitration; the individual is dependent on the union's willingness to
process the grievance even as far as arbitration. There is an extensive history of union
and employer cooperation in ignoring claims of racial discrimination, as well as in prac-
ticing active employment discrimination. See, e.g., Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F.2d
743, 747-48 (6th Cir. 1971); Flowers v. Laborers Local 6, 431 F.2d 205, 208 (7th Cir.
1970); Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 310 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Va. 1969);
Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Work-
ers. Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Schatzki]; Note, Judicial Deference to Arbitrators' Decisions in Title VII Cases, 26
STAN. L. REV. 421, 425-27 (1974).
Emporium: Limits on Protection for
Discrimination Grievants
After two decisions, one of which, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., facilitated individual action against racial discrimination and the
other of which, Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, made employee action
against safety hazards more onerous, the Supreme Court in a third case
re-evaluated the relative position of racial grievances within the overall
scheme of federal labor statutes.
In this most recent decision of the subject, Emporium Capwell Co.
v. Western Addition Community Organization,'2 the Court elaborated
on the implications of its sweeping ruling in Alexander. The opinion in
Emporium articulated finite limitations on "the national labor policy
against racial discrimination in employment"'3 the bounds of which had
seemed so indeterminate in Alexander. The Court in Alexander had
stressed the unique and elevated status of racial grievances in contrast to
other terms and conditions of employment. The circuit court in Empor-
ium adopted this approach and explicitly distinguished the nature of
race grievances:
[T]his right to non-discriminatory treatment differs significantly
from other "conditions of employment" which are also the subject
of exclusive bargaining, such as pension benefits or seniority rights.
The right to be free of racially discriminatory employment practices
does not depend upon the presence of an anti-discrimination clause
in a collective bargaining agreement, but is firmly rooted in the
law. 14
The Supreme Court's reversal of the circuit rejected the rationale that
when racial grievances are involved, employees are justified in
"bypass[ing] the grievance procedure"'15 to engage in otherwise unpro-
tected activity.
The Court in Emporium reaffirmed the supremacy of a primary
concept of collective bargaining, the "long and consistent adherence to
the principle of exclusive representation,"' 6 even over purported racial
grievances. The Court's agreement with the NLRB trial examiner's
finding "that the employees were discharged for attempting to bargain
12. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
13. Id. at 52.
14. Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 927
(D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'd on rehearing, 512 F.2d 992, rev'd sub. norn. Emporium Capwell
Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (citations
omitted).
15. 420 U.S. at 67.
16. Id. at 65.
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with the Company over the terms and conditions of employment as they
affected racial minorities" was a rejection of the employees' contention
that they were merely attempting to present a racial grievance to their
employer. 17
Moreover, the Court expressly rejected the court of appeals' crea-
tion of a limited exception protecting unauthorized concerted activity
taken in opposition to racial discrimination.' 8 The lower court had
found such concerted activity by a minority union faction to be protect-
ed because it held a "unique status" derived from national policy in the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and Title VII. 19 In contrast, the
Supreme Court forcefully reasserted that racial discrimination in em-
ployment "is an appropriate subject of bargaining" consequently "mak-
ing any claimed dereliction a matter subject to the grievance-arbitration
machinery as well as to the processes of Title VII." 20
Thus, the Court negated Alexander's implication that issues of
racial discrimination in employment could justify bypassing traditional
collective bargaining mechanisms. The Court declared that resort to
such "self-help"'" was based on a confusion of substantive rights with
procedures provided under the NLRA.22 Ironically, the Court's own
treatment in Alexander and Gateway of substantive rights as distin-
guished from statutorily imposed procedures had contributed to this
uncertainty. A comparison of Alexander and Gateway, set forth below,
reveals the sources of the confusion.23
Gateway: Arbitrability of an Employment
Safety Hazard
The result of these Supreme Court decisions concerning the princi-
ple of arbitration24 is a certain degree of accommodation between the
national policy favoring this process and other national objectives found
in statutes and so-called public policy.2 5 In any event, as Arnold Miller,
17. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 69.
19. Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 931
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
20. 420 U.S. at 69.
21. Id. at 60 n.8.
22. Id. at 69.
23. See text accompanying notes 101-11 infra.
24. Arbitration has been termed "the central institution in the administration of
collective bargaining contracts." Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398
U.S. 235, 252 (1970), quoting Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the
Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J 1547 (1963).
25. With the proliferation of legislation regulating aspects of the employer-em-
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the president of the United Mine Workers (UMW), commented after
Gateway20 was decided: "No one in law is going to sit on their cans in
Washington and tell members of the UMW that they have to work in
unsafe conditions while arbitration is going on."27
Gateway Coal had sought a federal injunction, under section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)21 to halt a UMW
strike and to compel the union to submit to arbitration. The company
claimed that a provision" in the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1968 (the agreement), the collective bargaining agree-
ment in force, dictated that this dispute be submitted to arbitration. The
union argued in rebuttal that the agreement's arbitration clause did not
govern a safety hazard dispute. Conflicts in contract interpretation
revolved about two clauses, a general section, which provided for "Set-
tlement of Local and District Disputes" by arbitration, and section (e),
which provided for a union mine safety committee with a right to
remove all mine workers from an area "where the committee believes an
immediate danger exists." 30 The UMW had struck in protest of an
alleged mine safety hazard presented by negligent personnel.3 After it
ployee relationship, head-on clashes among fundamental statutory principles are inevita-
ble. See Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 939 (ex-
clusivity of collective bargaining representation versus employment equality). See also
Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 919 (1970); Blumrosen, Public Policy Considerations in Labor Arbitration
Cases, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 217 (1960). On the need for recognition of inconsistencies
between competing policies and accommodation of these policies by agencies, see Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-58 (1958); McLean Trucking Co.
v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1944); Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S.
31, 47 (1942).
26. 414U.S. 368 (1974).
27. Charleston Gazette, Jan. 14, 1974, § A, at 1, col. 3. Miller has also been
quoted as saying: "Yet the industry even today insists that life and death questions of
mine safety are subject to arbitration by outside parties [under grievance procedures]
and that the miners whose lives are at stake must be bound by the results, whatever they
are." N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1974, at 78, col. 1-2.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). This section provides for suits in federal district
court for violation of collective bargaining contracts.
29. This provision mandated final and binding arbitration of "any local trouble
of any kind aris[ing] at the mine." 414 U.S. at 374-75.
30. Id. at 383.
31. The problem arose from an unusually low airflow in a section of the mine.
Investigation revealed that a ventilation structure had collapsed, blocking an airway.
Normal airflow was restored through repairs. After work had resumed, federal and state
inspection disclosed that despite the collapse of the ventilation structure, the three fore-
men who had measured the airflow at that time had failed to record any abnormality
in airflow.
Criminal charges were brought against the foremen by the state of Pennsylvania
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rejected the company's offer to arbitrate, the union continued to strike.
The district court accepted Gateway's contention that the broad arbitra-
tion clause of the contract governed this dispute and issued an injunction
to end the strike and to compel arbitration. 2
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's judgment and vacated the preliminary injunction.38 Reading the
above two provisions of the contract together, the court determined that
their joint effect was to produce an ambiguity as to whether the contract
demanded that safety disputes be submitted to binding arbitration.3 4
Having construed the contract as ambiguous on this issue, the court
of appeals reasoned that the general federal presumption in favor of
arbitration was in this case overcome by specific public policy considera-
tions inherent in the nature of safety disputes.3 5 The court stated that "a
dispute concerning the safety of the place and circumstances in which
employees are required to work is sui generis,"3 6 as it is supported by
specific statutory articulation in section 502 of the LMRA. 7
The court's thesis was that in the absence of explicit contractual
provision for arbitration of these disputes, courts ought not to imply
"any avoidable construction of a labor contract as requiring final dispo-
sition of safety disputes by arbitration. 3s The court's premise was:
Considerations of economic peace that favor arbitration of ordinary
disputes have little weight here. Men are not wont to submit mat-
ters of life or death to arbitration and no enlightened society en-
courages, much less requires, them to do so. . . . The arbitrator
is not staking his life on his impartial decision. It should not be
for falsification of the records; two of the three pleaded nolo contendere and paid $200
fines; the third foreman had retired. The company, advised by the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Environmental Resources that it could return the foremen to work "in view
of the satisfactory record and good performance of these forem[e]n in the past and
pending legal action," did reinstate the two foremen. Id. at 372 n.3. The presence of
the reinstated foremen in the mines precipitated the strike. The union contended that
the foremen were a safety hazard presenting "immediate danger." Id. at 383.
32. See id. at 372-73.
33. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157 (3rd Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414 U.S.
368 (1974).
34. Id. at 1159.
35. Id. at 1159-60.
36. Id. at 1159.
37. Id. at 1160. This section of the LMRA declares: "nor shall the quitting of
labor by. . . employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for
work at. . . [their] place of employment. . . be deemed a strike under this Act." 29
U.S.C. § 143 (1970). Because it read the contract as failing to provide for compulsory
arbitration of this dispute, the court found no basis for reading into the contract a corol-
lary implied duty not to strike over such a dispute.
38, 466 F.2d 1157, 1160 (3rd Cir. 1972).
the policy of the law to force the employees to stake theirs on his
judgment.2 9
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in a decision by
Justice Powell with dissent by Justice Douglas alone.4" The Court held
that the trial court had acted properly in enjoining the strike and
compelling arbitration. Gateway, when coupled with Alexander, marks
a significant step by the Court in defining the employment issues over
which the presumption of arbitrability extends.
The issue of employment safety hazards, held to be within the
arbitration clause reaching "any local trouble of any kind aris[ing] at
the mine," was subjected to the presumption of arbitrability enunciated
in the Steelworker's Trilogy.4 Justice Powell disposed of the question of
arbitrability by quoting the Trilogy's fiat that "[d]oubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage. 4 2 Supporting his conclusion by reference
to two prior Supreme Court decisions, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 77043 and Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.,44
Justice Powell stated that the presence of a broad arbitration clause, in
the absence of any express negation of a no-strike obligation, implies a
corresponding contractual duty not to strike, a duty breached in this
case by the UMW. "5 The Court therefore upheld the injunctive relief
ordered against the union's continued strike as appropriate under the
equitable principles of Boys Markets.
In Boys Markets, however, the Court's articulation of the situations
in which anti-strike injunctions could be issued despite the prohibition
of federal injunctions in the Norris-La Guardia Act,46 was qualified by
the express stipulation that the holding in the case
is a narrow one. We do not undermine the vitality of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. We deal only with the situation in which a col-
lective-bargaining contract contains a mandatory grievance adjust-
ment or arbitration procedure. Nor does it follow from what we
have said that injunctive relief is appropriate as a matter of course
in every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance. 47
39. id.
40. This dissent becomes even more noteworthy when one considers that it was
authored by a justice who was denominated as "the patron saint of arbitrators." Ad-
dress by Thomas Christensen, ABA Annual Convention, in Honolulu, August 1974.
41. 414 U.S. at 379.
42. Id. at 378, citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
43. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
44. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
45. 414 U.S. at 382.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
47. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. at 253-54 (emphasis
added).
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The Court in Boys Markets accommodated conflicting labor law policies
and concluded that "Norris-La Guardia's policy of nonintervention by
the federal courts should yield to the overriding interest in the successful
implementation of the arbitration process."4
Possible Exceptions to the Gateway Rule:
Formalities of Contract Met
In applying the equitable principles of the Boys Markets decision
to the situation in Gateway, the Court appears to have been influenced
by particular aspects of the specific facts involved.49 These factual
variations are highly significant in evaluating the prospective impact of
Gateway on cases concerning the arbitrability of safety disputes. The
thrust of this approach is that the Court has left open several escape
hatches by which a union may successfully refuse to work because of a
safety hazard without submitting the dispute to binding arbitration
despite contrary contractual provision. It should be remembered that the
court of appeals had found on the basis of two provisions (section (e)
of the contract, which provided for a union mine safety committee and
procedures for designation of "an immediate danger" and LMRA sec-
tion 502 which protected good faith work stoppages over hazardous
conditions), that safety disputes were not covered by the general
arbitration/no-strike obligation.50.
The Supreme Court's basis for rejection of these theories in Gate-
way must be read closely. In essence, Justice Powell found that the
union simply did not comply with the formal procedures prerequisite to
invocation of the provision in section (e) for work stoppage because of
a safety hazard.5 1 In contrast, the court of appeals, despite the failure of
the union safety committee to take*a formal vote on the hazard, regard-
ed the union membership vote determination of "an immediate danger"
as substantial compliance with section (e) procedures.52
Evidently concerned about losing any check on "arbitrary and
capricious" acts by the union, Justice Powell treated the union's lack of
exact procedural compliance as eliminating any argument that contract
clause (e) operated to confer upon the union the right to "call the
48. Id. at 252.
49. See 414 U.S. at 374, 387.
50. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 1159-60 (3rd Cir. 1972), rev'd,
414 U.S. 368 (1974).
51. 414 U.S. at 384.
52. Id.
workers off the job.""8 Whether such a contract provision, unambi-
guously articulated and formally complied with, could confer upon a
union such a right, even in the presence of a general arbitration/no-
strike clause, is expressly not decided. 54
While the caveat in Boys Markets stressed the importance of both
the interest in arbitration and the longstanding federal policy against
injunctions in labor disputes, the Court in Gateway seems to stress the
first interest to the detriment of the second. Although the anti-injunction
policy was an original premise of the first federal labor legislation, it
seems to be treated in Gateway as a period piece. While the opinion in
Boys Markets stipulated that its injunction was to be issued only in
situations in which arbitration was mandatory, and not "as a matter or
course," 5 the Court in Gateway applied the injunction in a contractual
situation involving considerable ambiguity as to whether arbitration of
the dispute in question was mandatory. The court of appeals decision in
itself indicates that the ambiguity could have been resolved either way.
Justice Powell, however, clearly read the equities in Gateway as
supporting the propriety of the injunction. True, the company would
have been gravely harmed by a continued strike. On the other hand, the
company's financial losses would have been irrelevant to the legality of
the UMW strike if section 502 of the LMRA operated to protect the
refusal to work.
Nature of the Hazard
Justice Powell's finding that section 502 did not protect this strike
should be strictly confined to these facts, for that conclusion is based on
the specific nature of the hazard alleged in Gateway. The Court disa-
greed with the court of appeals position that merely a good faith belief
in a safety hazard is enough to justify a work stoppage under section
502. While thus eschewing "so slender a thread as subjective judg-
53. Id. at 383-84.
54. Id. at 383. In Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 464
F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1972), the court also ordered the resolution of an employee safety
walk-out by arbitration. The court there held, however, that unlike the arbitration
clause in Gateway, the collective bargaining agreement at hand contained an express
clause requiring the submission of safety disputes to arbitration, while at the same time
giving the employees "a right to refuse to perform work which they feel affects their
safety." Id. at 567-68 n.2. Compare Gateway with the Eighth Circuit's forthright treat-
ment of the equities involved in the question of injunctive relief against such a work
stoppage. Id. at 568-70.
55. 398 U.S. at 254.
[Vol. 27THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
November 1975] EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND ARBITRATION 379
ment,"156 the Court did note that despite a contract's express or implied
no-strike obligation, "a work stoppage called solely to protect employees
from immediate danger is authorized by section 502 and cannot be the
basis for either a damages award or a Boys Markets injunction."' 7 This
proviso should prove to be of significant value for future cases.
Thus, when future facts show a real hazard, which presents imme-
diate danger, the employees' right to strike must be protected, even
though their contract forbids them that right. The Court construed
section 502 as a "limited exception" to the no-strike obligation, 58 rather
than the absolute exception which the court of appeals approach creat-
ed. It interpreted section 502 to require "ascertainable, objective evi-
dence supporting its conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition
for work exists."59
Justice Powell accepted and relied heavily on the reasoning of
Judge Rosenn's dissent in the court of appeals decision. Justice Powell's
strict construction of section 502 reflects a preoccupation with the
practical concern that a Pandora's Box of chaos and disorder60 in labor
relations could be opened if any employee could walk off the job on the
pretext of an allegation about another employee.
Admittedly, there is a duty to prevent meritless work stoppages.
The prevention of fraudulent claims, however, should not obscure and
eliminate the protection of workers from unsafe working conditions.0 '
The considerations which worried Judge Rosenn and Justice Powell are
not necessarily applicable to physical, mechanical safety hazards, allega-
tions of which would not be so easily susceptible to abuse. The outcome
in Gateway seems to have been determined largely by the intangible,
56. 414 U.S. at 386.
57. Id. at 385.
58. Id.
.59. Id. at 387.
60. "If employees may label another employee a working risk and thereupon en-
gage in a work stoppage which, because of its characterization as a safety strike, is un-
reviewable by arbitration or court, no employer can expect stability in labor relations.
Moreover, each employee is the possible victim of the attitudes, fancies and whims of
his fellow employees. Unions, themselves, will be at the mercy of 'wildcatters.'" Gate-
way Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 1162 (3rd Cir. 1972).
61. "In order for protection designed along the lines of section 502 to be meaning-
ful, however, the subjective good faith belief of the employees as to the existence of ab-
normally dangerous or unlawful conditions should be sufficient to invoke the statute."
Oldham, Organized Labor, The Environment, and The Taft-Hartley Act, 71 MiCH. L.
REV. 935, 1018 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Oldham]. Oldham's suggestion that there
be "[a] revival of the subjective test" is the outgrowth of his discussion of prior litigation
under section 502. See id. at 1017-20. See NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330
F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).
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human character of the alleged hazard. A different result might have
been reached had the hazard been concrete and mechanical. The Court,
however, did not specify that its ruling be limited to allegations concern-
ing hazardous personnel. This possible distinction is left for future
resolution.
Moreover, the state agency's permission to Gateway to reinstate the
suspended foremen12 strongly indicated that the purported hazard in
fact presented no immediate danger. Had the facts indeed conveyed the
impression of imminent danger, one may speculate that the majority
might have given a more expansive reading to the scope of section 502.
Since the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources did not
consider the facts of the case to indicate undue danger, however, the
Court had ample justification for compelling the union to accept the
company's demand to arbitrate the matter.
The Dissent: A Different Value to Competing Policies
Justice Douglas was the lone dissenter in Gateway. Since he had
been the author of the major building blocks of the Court's expansion of
arbitration, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills63 and the Steel-
workers Trilogy, he might have been expected to concur in any theories
affirming the broadest possible scope of arbitration. To the contrary, he
found that the general "presumption of arbitrability," which was ground-
ed on one "congressional expression of policy", 4 LMRA section 301,65
was overcome by another congressional policy, section 502 of the
same act. 6 He considered that the situation involved in Gateway was
subject to" 'the penumbra of express statutory mandates.' "67
As interpreted by Justice Douglas, the contract arbitration clause
did not apply to a dispute between the union mine safety committee and
the mine operator about the committee's recommendation. He saw no
basis for a countervailing presumption, because Congress did not extend
the "general policy favoring arbitration" to safety disputes, and conclud-
ed therefore that
[a]bsent any presumption, I cannot find that ,the dispute here was
arbitrable or that the union was under any duty not to strike. It
62. 414 U.S. 389.
63. 353 U.S. 448 (1958).
64. 414 U.S. at 391.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970).
67. 414 U.S. at 392.
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follows then, as the Court of Appeals found, that there was no
wrong to remedy. 8
The dissent emphasized the history of the coal mine industry's
"reckless disregard for the miners' safety." 60 Justice Douglas implied
that the history of mining is replete with incidents of disregard for
employee rights as flagrant as that in the race cases and equally justify-
ing an exception to the general policy of arbitration. Specifically, the
nature of the dispute in Gateway distinguished it from the usual griev-
ances resolved in arbitration proceedings. "The dispute in this labor case
does not involve hourly wages, pension benefits, or the like. It involves
the life and death of the workers in the most dangerous occupation in
America. 7 °
Alexander: Arbitrability of Racial Discrimination
in Employment
Not surprisingly then, Justice Douglas also wrote the sole dissent in
Emporium,71 which was decided a year later. Justice Douglas relied on
the decision in Alexander to urge again that whenever racial discrimina-
tion grievances are concerned, no matter how irregular the manner in
which they have been raised, employees are not conclusively bound by
duly contracted union procedures. In his view Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196472 requires that all labor laws must be construed in
light of the policy of elimination of employment discrimination. 73 His
position in Emporium was that "[t]he Court's opinion makes these
Union members-and others similarly situated-prisoners of the Un-
ion.174 At the heart of the problem in Emporium, according to Justice
Douglas, was the necessity for a determination involving the union's duty
of fair representation, that is, a decision delineating the rights of an
individual employee against a discriminatory union. The law on union
breach of a duty of fair representation was in fact an influential factor in
68. Id.
69. Id. at 388-89.
70. Id. at 388. Cf. Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 217 (1964) (Stew-
art, J., concurring). In a list of what matters are included within terms and conditions
of employment, one example given by the Board in Fibreboard Corp. is "what safety
practices are observed." Id. at 222. For a comprehensive history of the phrase "condi-
tions of employment" see Oldham, supra note 61, at 981-1002.
71. Emporium Capwell Co. v. NLRB, 420 U.S. 50, 73 (1975).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1970 & Supp. m, 1973).
73. 420 U.S. at 76.
74. Id. at 73.
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the Court's analysis in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.75 of an em-
ployee's rights and remedies against racial discrimination."G
Alexander was decided by the Supreme Court just one month after
Gateway, in the beginning of 1974. On the surface, the Court seems to
have been faced with an allegation similar to that in Gateway, that an
employee or employees cannot be compelled to submit particular statu-
tory rights to final resolution by arbitration. Nonetheless, the Court
gave the issue apparently contradictory treatment, seemingly dependent
upon the nature of the right at issue. Nevertheless, the factual distinc-
tions in the two cases and their respective procedural frameworks are
significant.
Alexander sued in federal district court where he alleged that he
had been discriminatorily discharged in violation of Title VII from his
trainee position as drill operator with Gardner-Denver. The collective
bargaining agreement in Alexander included a general anti-discrimina-
tion clause and a broad arbitration clause covering "any trouble
aris[ing] in the plant."77 Alexander's grievance was submitted to an
arbitrator who ruled that Alexander had been discharged for just
cause. 71 In addition, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) ruled that there was no reasonable cause to believe that a
violation of Title VII had occurred. The district court then granted
Gardner-Denver's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the
action on the theory of election of remedies. 79 The court treated the
adverse arbitral determination of Alexander's grievance as precluding
him from subsequently suing the employer on that grievance under Title
VII. The court of appeals affirmed per curiam the district court deci-
sion.80
75. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
76. See text accompanying notes 90-97 il ra.
77. 415 U.S. at 40.
78. There was testimony at the arbitration hearing that the company's usual prac-
tice with unsatisfactory drill operators was to transfer them back to their former posi-
tions rather than to discharge them. Id. at 42.
79. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971), afj'd
per curiam, 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The Supreme
Court noted that the district court's reliance on this election of remedies theory was
based on Alexander's concession in a deposition that he had already raised his racial
discrimination grievance in the course of arbitration. 415 U.S. at 43 n.4. The Court
later pointed out that the lower courts that had relied on a supposed election of reme-
dies theory had alternatively labeled it collateral estoppel or res judicata. Nevertheless,
the Court noted that the basic concept is one of waiver of rights, and it dismissed any
significant doctrinal differences among the theories as extraneous. Id. at 49 n.10.
80. 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).
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Title VII and Arbitrability
The Supreme Court reversed, in another opinion by Justice Powell,
and this time the decision was unanimous. The Court held that the
federal policy favoring arbitration cannot operate to deprive an individu-
al employee of his private cause of action under Title VII. The Court
interpreted congressional intent in creating Title VII to be clearly "to
supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating
to employment discrimination." ' Therefore, the Court reasoned, the
individual has an independent statutory right to sue in federal court even
though an arbitrator has made a final ruling against him. The Court
explicitly rejected the theory that this right to federal judicial relief may
be precluded by arbitration; in fact, it held that the right entitles the
plaintiff to a trial de novo, without any necessity for deferral to the
arbitral finding."2 The doctrine of election of remedies was found to be
inapplicable. The Court rejected the customary rule of deferral to arbi-
tral decisions for specific reasons concerning the inadequacy of arbitra-
tion proceedings: the incompleteness of records, the lack of rules of
evidence, the severely limited discovery, the lack of compulsory process,
and the absence of testimony and cross-examination under oath. 3
Although it rejected a formal rule of judicial deferral to arbitral
decisions, the Court left for future decision the question of what weight
the award may be given as evidence in the Title VII claim for relief. The
Court expressly left this evaluation to the discretion of the trial court,
saying "[we adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an
arbitral decision."8 4 The issue, however, is only briefly discussed in a
footnote to the last sentence of the opinion and is likely to reappear in
future litigation. As a practical matter, the Courts proviso may function
similarly to the rejected Rios rule of deferral, vesting final responsibility
for vindication of Title VII rights in the federal courts rather than in the
arbitration process.
Contrary to their usual liberality in construing statutes to expand
the scope of arbitration, the justices in this case paid unusual attention to
technical statutory procedure and to the exact details of how the case
arrived before them. The Court considered both the legislative history
of Title VII and the cases in the lower courts dealing with discrimination
in employment.88 The result was a determination that carves out Title
81. 415 U.S. at 48-49.
82. Id. at 60.
83. Id. at 57-58.
84. Id. at 60 n.21.
85. Id. at 45, 47-49.
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VII grievances as comprising a unique category of rights never sus-
ceptible of final resolution by arbitration.,
A Court-Created Dichotomy in Employment Rights
Thus the Court has articulated a dichotomy between employment
rights: freedom from racial discrimination and freedom from hazardous
working conditions. While the Court rejected the characterization of the
latter as sui generis, it afforded the former distinctive treatment. The
Court's willingness to depart from its long pattern of promotion of
arbitration makes sense only when one considers the unstated reasons
for its decision. Rather than the legislative history, the determinant
appears to have been the Court's distrust, based on a lengthy record of
failure to prosecute, of the sincerity of unions in dealing with racial
grievances. 81
Footnote 19 of the Alexander opinion seems to be the closest the
Court comes to disclosure of the fundamental reason for its decision:
that the union-controlled arbitral process cannot be counted on to
vindicate these rights against discrimination."' Because arbitrators are
generally selected by agreement between employer and union, and
receive their compensation from them, institutional pressures are created
which render suspect the efficacy of the arbitral process as a remedy for
racial discrimination. 89
This syndrome had been profoundly aggravated in 1967 by the
Supreme Court's criticized ruling in Vaca v. Sipes. 0 The Court in Vaca
86. Id. at 51.
87. When one views this decision as one of a long line of employment discrimi-
nation cases, this retreat from total deference to arbitration seems to be the logical out-
growth of previous decisions. For the history of union failure to process the claims of
Black grievants constituting breach of the statutory duty of fair representation of the
bargaining unit, see Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969); Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). For documentation of this union role see Hebert & Rei-
schel, supra note 9, at 456 & nn.25-26. For example, thirty-five of fifty-eight pat-
tern or practice suits filed by the Justice Department through 1970 were brought against
unions. Many of these suits were also brought against companies. For the fiscal year
1969 the largest body of charges before the EEOC involved union practices of exclusion
and discrimination on the basis of race. Id.
88. "Moreover, harmony of interest between the union and the individual em-
ployee cannot always be presumed, especially where a claim of racial discrimination is
made." 415 U.S. at 58 n.19.
89. See note 11 supra. See also Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Repre-
sentation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1336-37
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Wellington] (noting that individual rights may be short-
changed in the majoritarian process of arriving at compromise agreements.)
90. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). In Jaca, the Court held that an employee cannot sue
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held that unless an employee can make the requisite showing of union
bad faith in its failure to process his grievance he cannot pursue his
claim for breach of the duty of fair representation because the com-
pany can defend on the gornud that the employee has contractual reme-
dies.91 As Professor Gould comments: "With a heavy and repressive
hand Vaca imposes upon the worker the burden of proving that the
union has breached its duty of fair representation before the matter
may be pursued in court."92
The burden of proof concerning subjective intent amounts to a
nearly insurmountable obstacle for individual employees.93 The practical
impact of this requirement is that the individual employee has no
absolute right to take his grievance to arbitration. 4 For instance, a
union may decide not to process an individual's grievance because of a
perceived conflict with other collective interests.95 It will weigh one
his employer for breach of the terms of the collective bargaining contract, when there
is an arbitration clause in the contract which is applicable to his grievance, unless that
employee is able to show that the union's refusal to process the claim "is arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or in bad faith." Id. at 190. For critical commentary, see Bennett & Ben-
nett, supra note 9, at 68; Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Dis-
crimination, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 40, 42-43 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Gould]; Schatzki,
supra note 11, at 898-99 & n.6; Note, Individual Control over Personal Grievances
Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE LJ. 559 (1968).
91. 386 U.S. at 186-87.
92. Gould, supra note 90, at 43.
93. Justice Black warned in his dissent that the Court's decision turned the em-
ployee's lawsuit "intro a three-ring donnybrook." 386 U.S. at 210.
94. "[M~e do not agree that the individual employee has an absolute right to have
his grievance taken to arbitration regardless of the provisions of the applicable collective
bargaining agreement." Id. at 191.
95. Professor Summers aptly describes one of the ways in which the interests of
the individual employee diverge most significantly from those of the collective union:
"The individual's interest may more often be vitiated without vindictiveness or deliberate
discrimination. Incomplete investigation of the facts, reliance on untested evidence, or
colored evaluation of witnesses may lead the union to reject grievances which more ob-
jective inquiry would prove meritorious. Union officials burdened with institutional con-
cerns may be willing to barter unrelated grievances or accept wholesale settlements if
the total package is advantageous, even though some good grievances are lost. Concern
for collective interests and the need of the enterprise may dull the sense of personal in-
justice." Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37
N.Y.U.L. REv. 362, 393 (1962). As one commentator recently concluded, "To assume
that unions. . . will always protect the interest of the employees and public is pure legal
schizophrenia. To assume that arbitrators, wholly dependent upon unions and employ-
ers, will render wise, knowledgeable decisions reflecting consideration of all interests is
utter naivet6." Comment, The Ascendency of Labor-Arbitration and the Confusion of
Labor Arbitrators: A Case of Congressional Neglect, 62 Ky. L.J. 505, 532 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Ascendency of Labor-Arbitration]. For reasons why a union would
discriminate against a minority in the union, see Wellington, supra note 89, at 1334.
interest against the others, thus making the individual claim a right only
when the union decides to allow it. The dissent in Emporium constituted
essentially a denouncement of the Vaca standard in cases of racial
discrimination on the basis that "[ulnion conduct can be oppressive
even if not made in bad faith."'96 Significantly, in a recent decision
upholding a court award of back pay as a remedy for employer discrimi-
nation, the Court declared that a victim does not have to prove bad faith
to recover.
97
In the late sixties and early seventies, cases before a number of
courts posed the apparent conflict between two primary national labor
policies, the encouragement of arbitration and the elimination of em-
ployment discrimination. 98  These cases demonstrated the inherent ten-
96. Emporium Capwell Co. v. NLRB, 420 U.S. 50, 76 (1975).
97. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975).
98. The uncertainty as to the circumstances under which arbitral resolution of a
grievance foreclosed an employee from instituting a lawsuit de novo in federal district
court under Title VII gave rise to extensive litigation. The result was a growing stress
on the independence of Title VII rights. Nevertheless, the federal courts reached diver-
gent conclusions.
The Fifth Circuit held that submission of a grievance to the arbitration process does
not constitute an election of remedies foreclosing availability of the Title VII lawsuit.
Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); accord, Oubichon
v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1973); Bowe v. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
The Sixth Circuit took the opposite position, finding the plaintiff barred from suing
under Title VII after a final, binding, and conclusive arbitral decision. Dewey v. Rey-
nolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
Note, however, that the circuit court in Dewey had concluded that no Title VII violation
had in fact occurred; hence, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court's affirmance meant
acceptance of the circuit's view that arbitration foreclosed the statutory remedy. See
Bennett & Bennett, supra note 9, at 70-71.
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the ultimate authority of the federal
courts concerning Title VII rights, creating an accommodation between the process of
arbitration and the elimination of employment discrimination by establishing demanding
standards for judicial deferral to arbitration. Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d
54 (5th Cir. 1972). Rios standards for deferral, applicable only when "the contractual
right coincides with rights under Title VII," provide a more exacting analogue to the
Spielberg standards of general board deferral to prior arbitral findings. Compare Spiel-
berg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 with Rios v. Reynolds Metal Co., 467 F.2d
54, 58 (5th Cir. 1972).
The Rios criteria essentially become "a review of the arbitration proceeding," allow-
ing deferral only when the following five standards are met: "(1) the factual issues be-
fore it are identical to those decided by the arbitrator; (2) the arbitrator had power un-
der the collective agreement to decide the ultimate issue of discrimination; (3) the evi-
dence presented at the arbitral hearing dealt adequately with all factual issues; (4) the
arbitrator actually decided the factual issues presented to the court; (5) the arbitration
proceeding was fair and regular and free of procedural infirmities." Id. at 58.
See Note, Judicial Deference to Arbitrators' Decisions in Title VII Cases, 26 STAN.
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dency toward conflict between interests of the individual employee
and those of the union as a whole. 9 On the other hand, there is no
reason to think, nor any case law to demonstrate, that unions are less
than vigorous or diligent in representing the interests of individual
members in questions of occupational safety.100 The element of union
bad faith marks the difference between the two situations.
In matters of safety the same dynamic is simply not at work. One
may assume that the interests of all the union's members in any safety
grievance will coincide;1°1 all union members have the same interest in
the elimination of on-the-job hazards. The interests of the individual
member of a racial minority who alleges discrimination, however, may
be quite distinct from those pursued by the union as a collective body.
Thus the effect of union control of a member's access to arbitration is
that the suitability of arbitration to resolve employee grievances varies
dramatically with the nature of the rights at stake.
L. Rnv. 421 (1974). This approach was widely hailed as the solution to the confusion
of overlapping remedies. See, e.g., Gosseen, supra note 9, at 459. The voluminous com-
mentary was as thoroughly divided as the circuits. For commentary, opposing preclu-
sion of the Title VII suit by arbitration, see Bennett & Bennett, supra note 9; Hebert
& Reischel, supra note 9, at 469; Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and Con-
flicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 30, 43 (1971);
Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Employment: A Comparative Evaluation
of Forums, 46 U. WASH. L. REv. 455, 468 (1971); Comment, Policy Conflict: Should
an Arbitration Award Be Allowed to Bar a Suit Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964?, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 84 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Policy Conflict]; Comment,
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.: Labor Arbitration and Title VII, 119 U. PA. L. Rv.
684, 691-94 (1971). For commentary advocating a Spielberg type of deferral to arbitral
determination, see Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitra-
tion Under Title VII, 69 MicH. L. REv. 599 (1971); Developments in the Law-Em-
ployment Discrimination anzd Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1109, 1227-28 (1971).
99. On this tension between individual rights and the majority rule principle, see
Oldham, supra note 61, at 1010-17 (discussion of the circuit cases dealing with the ques-
tion of concerted minority action).
100. Oldham, however, suggests that "the record of organized labor on occupational
health may be less than outstanding." Id. at 963. Occasionally, union action is "so
oriented toward compromise that the union becomes the hostage of the industry." Id.
at 966 n.108. A prime example is the UMW's "long history of environmental involve-
ment-involvement that has been deferential to industry and generally ineffective." Id.
101. See generally J. PAGE & M. O'BRiEN, BrrrER WAGES: RALPH NADEs's STUDY
GROUP REPORT ON DisEASE AND INJURY ON Tm JOB (1973). Oldham suggests some
reasons for union reluctance to assert environmental hazards, "including the persistent
fear, at the local level in particular of job losses; the need to apply limited union re-
sources to priorities that seem more immediate to the worker in the workplace; the ex-
istence of other organizations and agencies designed to spend all of their energies on
environmental problems; and presumed limitations on the legal possibilities within la-
bor's jurisdiction." Oldham, supra note 61, at 1026.
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Consequently, the underlying substantive considerations must be
addressed in order adequately to determine the proper relationship be-
tween these different public and private (contractual) remedial systems.
It has been argued that the judiciary has, in its decisions, simply dis-
guised its true concern with preventing mundane disputes about work-
ing conditions from overwhelming the court system, while at the same
time hesitating to undermine the favored status of arbitration by deci-
sions based mainly on a dubious doctrine of election of remedies.' 1°2
The circuit court decisions and the Supreme Court's decision in Alex-
ander do little to clarify the substantive concerns involved as they share
the flaw of presenting a less than satisfying analysis of the rights in-
volved.10
The Rule of Rationale Without Analysis
It is relatively easy for a court to say, as did the Fourth Circuit, for
example, in 1971: "The rights assured by title VII are not rights which
can be bargained away-either by a union, by an employer, or by both
acting in concert."' 4 This statement, however, is merely a conclusion.
The more significant consideration is the reasoning behind the conclu-
sion. The opinion in Alexander was similarly grounded on conclusory
statements rather than exposition of the reasons underlying those con-
clusions. Legislative history and evidence of congressional intent in
enacting Title VII do constitute persuasive evidence that Congress con-
templated that the Title VII right was absolute, regardless of the number
of existing overlapping remedies. 0 5
102. See, e.g., Policy Conflict, supra note 98, at 85.
103. See id. at 111-12. "The courts have been reluctant to openly base their deci-
sions on policy balancing." Id.
104. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1971).
105. Before the advent of Title VII, with its own institutional apparatus (the
EEOC), there was already an overlap of three institutions: the courts, the NLRB, and
arbitration. Congress's approach of simply adding another remedy, which was to be en-
forced with the courts' existing powers, further aggravated the existing confusion. The
act specifically rules out the possibility of federal preemption, allowing parallel remedies
under state and federal law. While the act did not precisely define the relationship be-
tween these measures as to possible res judicata effects, there was ample available docu-
mentation of the widespread expectation of noninterference with existing rights and rem-
dies. The following is one such example: "[niothing in title VII or anywhere else
in this bill affects the rights and obligations under the NLRA and the Railway Labor
Act. The procedures set up in title VII are the exclusive means of relief against those
practices of discrimination which are forbidden as unlawful employment practices . . ..
Of course, title VII is not intended to and does not deny to any indivdual, rights and
remedies which he may pursue under other Federal and State statutes. If a given action
should violate both title VII and the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor
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Nonetheless, Congress failed explicitly to consider whether or not
the particular overlapping remedy 06 of binding arbitration, provided for
in a mutually agreed upon contract, could apply in the case of griev-
ances for which Title VII provided a cause of action in federal district
court. Indeed, the Supreme Court conceded in so many words that the
statute does not demand this course: "Title VIE does not speak expressly
to the relationship between federal courts and the grievance-arbitration
machinery of collective-bargaining agreements."' 07
Title VII does confer the right, remediable in federal court, to
equal employment. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit, for example, has
held that this statutory right could be sufficiently protected by the
arbitration process. 1 8 The inconclusive statutory language of Title VII
is an unconvincing reason for substantial deviation from a consistent
national policy of encouragement of arbitration. Moreover, the decision
in Alexander fails to articulate the substantive reasoning underlying the
deviation in that particular case.
The Supreme Court in Alexander could have found precedent for
treating the arbitrator's decision as final. Support for this finding was
readily available in Justice Douglas's language lauding the arbitrator in
the Trilogy.0 9 During the past decade, the Court has reiterated its faith
Relations Board would not be deprived of jurisdiction .... On the other hand, where
the procedures of Title VII are involved, the remedies available are those set out in Sec-
tion 707(e) [subsequently renumbered 706(g)], injunctive relief against continued dis-
crimination, plus appropriate affirmative action including . . . backpay." 110 CONG.
REC. 7207 (1964) (memorandum of Senator Clark). See, e.g., Beverly v. Lone Star
Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 n.22 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Hebert &
Reischel, supra note 9.
106. The questions of NLRB deference to arbitration and Supreme Court deference
to the NLRB, though obviously significant to the resolution of racial grievances in em-
ployment, raise independent questions beyond the scope of this article and have been
treated elsewhere. See, e.g., Gosseen, supra note 9, at 445-53; Comment, The Inevitable
Interplay of Title VII and the National Labor Relations Act: A New Role for the
NLRB, 123 U. PA. L. Rnv. 158 (1974). See also, Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B.
837 (1971) (establishing systematic Board policy of deferral to arbitration). But see
Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J. 57, 74
(1973).
107. 415 U.S. at 47.
108. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970). The court
there claimed that were it to permit a Title VII suit after final unfavorable arbitration,
'This result could sound the death knell to arbitration of labor disputes, which has been
so usefully employed in their settlement. Employers would not be inclined to agree to
arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements if they provide only a one-way
street, i.e., that the awards are binding on them but not on their employees." Id. at
332.
109. "The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in
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in the efficacy of arbitration.1 ' In fact, grievances involving racial
discrimination have been the only "working conditions" claims for
which the Court has been willing to rule that arbitral determination of a
dispute never precludes redetermination of the same dispute in court.
On the other hand, it would seem reasonable that regardless of the
Court's tendency to extol the virtues of arbitration, the holding in
Alexander must necessarily extend to all forms of Title VII discrimina-
tion."'
In a major employment discrimination case112 immediately follow-
ing Alexander, the Fifth Circuit elaborated upon the multiple, and
overlapping, remedies available to challenge union discrimination. The
his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment
to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for
judgment." United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
110. E.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970);
Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).
111. Cases of sex and race discrimination are of interchangeable precedential value.
Bennett & Bennett, supra note 9, at 83; accord, Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d
711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969). Nevertheless, some cases do indicate a judicial reluctance to
hold sex discrimination and race discrimination equally important. The lower courts
seem clearly to have been drawing a distinction between these different forms of discrim-
ination, although this distinction is unwarranted by the language of Title VII. There is
an implication that sex discrimination is not as "bad" as race discrimination. But see,
e.g., Mill Workers Local 186 v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D.
Ind. 1969). The court in Mill Workers Local 186 stated: "The Court, however, does not
and will not draw any legal distinctions between the seriousness and gravamen of the
acts and policies of sexual discrimination alleged herein and the more frequently litigated
acts of racial discrimination. Significant social and moral differences may indeed exist
between the two types of discrimination, which Congress apparently recognized pro
tanto. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). On the facts herein alleged, however, no purpose would
be served by so distinguishing the cases on this basis .. " Id. at 1287. Note, however,
that the Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment, in a footnote to a recent decision,
on the correctness of the circuit court decisions which accorded only limited relief to
sex discrimination claims. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 2374 n.18
(1975).
For a comprehensive collection of cases illustrating the judicial tendency to differ-
entiate the reprehensibility of different grounds of discrimination, see Policy Conflict,
supra note 98, at 87 n.15. See also Wellington, supra note 89, at 1235-36, (noting there
are distinctions between the different forms of discrimination); Cf. Trivett v. Tri-State
Container Corp., 368 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). In Trivett, the court denied
the employer's request to stay the employee's Title VII sex discrimination grievance
pending arbitral resolution. In allowing the plaintiff's claim, the court found that the
collective bargaining agreement had not provided for arbitration of this grievance; the
contract contained no prohibition of sex discrimination. Hence, in accord with the Rios
formulation, the court found it was under no obligation to "defer to the results of arbi-
tration herein." Id. at 137.
112. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
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court ruled that the longshoremen union's hiring hall referral system did
not bring the Mexican plaintiffs within Title VII because the allegation
of discrimination was based not on national origin, but on their alien
status.118 Nevertheless, with an extended and comprehensive discussion
which relied heavily on Alexander, the Fifth Circuit upheld the availa-
bility of independent overlapping remedies under Title VII, the NLRA,
the Civil Rights Act of 18661"' and arbitration to attack the same
grievances. 11
5
A Precursor
The Court's treatment of Title VII rights as distinctive was pres-
aged in Justice Powell's opinion for a unanimous Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green."6 The Court's analysis of the elements of a
Title VII lawsuit prepared the way for his subsequent absolutist inter-
pretation of Title VII rights. The Court had stated in a 1971 decision
that the EEOC's administrative interpretations of Title VII were "en-
titled to great deference.""' McDonnell, however, marked a definitive
move away from a policy of deference to prior nonjudicial findings,
stressing instead the importance of preserving the employee's right to
bring his Title VII lawsuit in federal court. This right to a day in court
was to exist regardless of an EEOC finding of no reasonable cause to
believe there has been a violation of Title VII." s The Court approved
the circuit courts' theory that Title VII lawsuits are de novo proceedings
which are not barred by prior adverse EEOC determinations." 9
113. Id. at 646-47. The Supreme Court had ruled that Title VII did not apply to
discrimination solely on the basis of lack of citizenship, when the discrimination was
not "one part of a wider scheme of unlawful national-origin discrimination." Espinoza
v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 92 (1973).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
115. "In the war against employment discrimination our agony over tactical prob-
lems lying ahead of us must not force us to retreat from all battlefields. Rather, we
must continue to evolve a strategy for deploying multiple skirmishes toward a common
objective. Congress did not intend to channel all offensives through a single salient,
and in this battle we approve maneuvers on two fronts." Guerra v. Manchester Termi-
nal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 658-59 (5th Cir. 1974).
116. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
117. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-34 (1971).
118. "The Act does not restrict a complainant's right to sue to those charges as
to which the Commission has made findings of reasonable cause, and we will not engraft
on the statute a requirement which may inhibit the review of claims of employment dis-
crimination in the federal courts." 411 U.S. at 798-99.
119. A variety of cases before the circuit courts in the early seventies stressed the
importance of access to federal court under Title VII regardless of what legal alterna-
tives had been or were then available, holding that previous litigation before a state hu-
Green, a black mechanic and laboratory technician in McDonnell's
aerospace and aircraft plant, was a long-time civil rights activist. Claim-
ing that his discharge was racially motivated, and that McDonnell's
general hiring practices were discriminatory, Green participated with
other Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) members in an illegal "stall-
in", which blocked access to McDonnell. As a result, he was arrested
and pleaded guilty to the charge of obstructing traffic. The Supreme
Court in its remand of Green's case to the district court gave directions
as to "the order and allocation of proof."'120 It pointed out that the
district court had been in error in dismissing that part of Green's claim
based on section 703 (a)(1) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,' 2 ' simply
because the EEOC had not made a finding of reasonable cause to
believe that that section had been violated. The district court had also
found that section 704(a) of the act'22 did not protect Green's illegal
activities.
The Supreme Court directed that the initial burden of proof in a
Title VII trial be on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. Once this requirement is met, the burden shifts to the
employer to show a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for his rejec-
tion of the employee. 2 ' The Court noted for purposes of the trial on
remand that an employer "may justifiably refuse to rehire one who was
engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if this criterion
is applied alike to members of all races.' 24 In sum, the EEOC's finding
should not have been allowed to deprive Green of the opportunity to
prove in a federal trial that McDonnell's alleged reason for refusing to
rehire him was merely a pretext.
The Court in McDonnell indicated a willingness to downplay the
man rights commission is no bar to seeking relief under Title VII. See, e.g., Cooper
v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972); Lopez v. State Foundry & Mach.
Inc., 336 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
Similarly, prior unsuccessful action under the NLRA contesting revision of a sen-
iority system was held not to foreclose a Title VII action challenging the same revision.
Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., 429 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1970). In the same spirit, four
circuit courts held that Title VII actions can be brought in federal court de novo, and
are not foreclosed by an EEOC finding of no reasonable cause. See Robinson v. Loril-
lard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 800 (4th Cir. 1971); Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp.,
437 F.2d 1136, 1141 (5th Cir. 1971); Flowers v. Laborers Local 6, 431 F.2d 205 (7th
Cir. 1970); Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3rd Cir. 1970).
120. 411 U.S. at 800.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1970).
123. 411 U.S. at 802.
124. Id. at 804,
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significance of racial discrimination determinations by nonjudicial insti-
tutions such as the EEOC. Thus, even before Alexander, the Supreme
Court had indicated its view that Title VII enforcement was the peculiar
province of the federal courts. Justice Powell, in fact, prefaced his
conclusion in Alexander that "final responsibility for enforcement of
Title VII is vested with federal courts"'12 5 by pointing out the inadequa-
cy of the EEOC's enforcement powers even under the 1972 amend-
ments.126 These amendments to Title VII12 7 indicated some measure of
congressional dissatisfaction with the limited results which the EEOC,
owing to the statutory restrictions on its powers, had achieved through
reliance on voluntary compliance. When the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the importance of the EEOC's enforcement powers, it was, of
course, simply articulating the conclusion of the circuit courts concern-
ing this same administrative ineffectuality. 12 The thrust of the legisla-
tive history of the 1972 amendments was a belated congressional realiza-
tion of the crucial role of the federal courts in vindicating Title VII
rights.' 29
125. 415 U.S. at 44.
126. Id. at 44-45; Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 4, 86 Stat. 103.
127. "If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this sec-
tion, is dismissed by the Commission... the Commission ... shall so notify the per-
son aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may
be brought against the respondent named in the charge . . . by the person claiming to
be aggrieved .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. I, 1973).
128. The Third Circuit, in allowing a Title VII discrimination grievant to sue in
federal court despite an EEOC finding of no reasonable cause, declared: "We cannot ac-
cept the hypothesis that Congress intended to entrust the key to judicial relief with an
agency given no power to direct the processing of a civil action in court." Fekete v.
United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 336 (3rd Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted); ac-
cord, Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971). In Bev-
erly, after detailing the factfinding inadequacies of the Commission, the court noted:
"In the circumstances of this case the courts afford the only effective remedy under the
present state of the law. Lawsuits and disputes are for the courts. We will not permit
the single finding of this investigating agency to stand as a complete defense which pre-
cludes all hope of adversary adjudication or remedial action in the courts." Id. at 1141
(emphasis added). See Draper, A Historical Sketch of the Major Labor Law Develop-
ments That Have Occurred as a Result of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Activi-
ties of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 18 How. L.J. 29 (1973) (num-
bers and types of cases brought); Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 824 (1972) (analysis of
weaknesses of Title VII protections).
129. "Title VII, as it now stands, is little more than a declaration of national pol-
icy. Regretably, the practices and policies of discrimination in employment are so
deeply ingrained that the voluntary conciliation approach has not succeeded in ade-
quately combating the existence of such practices.
In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and
distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the part of some identifiable
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A telling aspect of Justice Powell's opinions in both Alexander and
Gateway is his consideration of the appropriateness and efficacy of arbi-
tration procedures in the resolution of the types of disputes which the
two cases presented.130 Justice Powell treated safety disputes as indistin-
guishable from everyday contractual grievances, which present common
questions fully within "the special expertise of the labor arbitrator, with
his knowledge of the common law of the shop."'' In contrast, he
reasoned, discrimination grievances under Title VII involve statutory
rights demanding expertise in the "law of the land" rather than the "law
of the shop."'1 32
Furthermore, the arbitrator's role is strictly limited to interpreting
the intent of the parties expressed in the terms of the collective bargain-
ing contract, and such a determination may very likely clash directly
with statutory policies. 33 Justice Powell's opinion in Alexander that
individual or organization. It was thought that a scheme that stressed conciliation
rather than compulsory processes would be most appropriate for the resolution of this
essentially 'human' problem, and that litigation would be necessary only on an occa-
sional basis. Experience has shown this view to be false." S. Misc. Doc. No. 92-415,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1971).
130. Compare 415 U.S. at 53-54, 56-58 with 414 U.S. at 378-80.
131. 414 U.S. at 379.
132. 415 U.S. at 57. Hence, in a recent case after Alexander, one circuit found
that the employees' right to sue based on a grievance concerning overtime compensation
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, was foreclosed after the same grievance had been
submitted to final arbitration. Satterwhite v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 496 F.2d 448
(10th Cir. 1974). The Tenth Circuit retained this distinction based on the character
of grievances and hinged its decision on the finality to be accorded the arbitrator's de-
termination on the basis of the nature of the dispute: "Wages and hours are at the heart
of the collective-bargaining process. They are more akin to collective rights than to in-
dividual rights, and are more suitable to the arbitral process than Title VII rights ...
We are concerned with rate of pay, an issue which does not require, or lend itself to,
public law considerations." Id. at 451. Thus this court accepted the company's plea
of the arbitration award as a defense and dismissed the lawsuit.
133. The theoretical role of the arbitrator is the subject of an ongoing debate
among commentators: is his province strictly the "law of the contract," or may he also
consider the "law of the land"? Arbitrators are almost evenly divided as to whether
it is proper for them to consider anything other than the intent of the parties as ex-
pressed in the collective bargaining contract. Some argue the parties' intent may be
modified to the extent that the arbitrator deems required for by statute or by principles
of equity.
The dichotomy is sharper in rhetoric than in actual practice where it may often
be skirted by such reasoning as the following: "the law is thus, hence you must have
meant to say this same thing." See Cushmen, Arbitration and the NLRB, in 20TH NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE ON LABOR 149, 152 (1968); O'Connel, Should the Scope
of Arbitration Be Restructured, in PROCEEDINGS OF 18TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 102, 120-28 (1965); Aaron, Some Procedural Problems in
Arbitration, 10 VAND. L. REV. 733, 734-35 (1957); Davey, Restructuring Grievance Ar-
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arbitration is an "inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights
created by Title VII' 13 4 seems to have been based upon more than the
statutory origin of the rights in issue. Even though these same rights
were explicitly written into the collective bargaining contract in the exact
language of Title VII, Justice Powell still objected to their resolution by
arbitration. He only hinted at the reason for this objection: that unions
as the exclusive representatives of individual employees have long coop-
erated with employers in maintaining employment discrimination.
Collective vs. Individual Rights
As noted in Alexander, some employment rights are "majoritari-
an," rights inhering in the union as a collective body, while those
conferred explicitly by Title VII are individual rights.13 5 These individu-
al rights are not susceptible of waiver by contract. To say that one
statute confers individual rights, however, amounts only to further la-
beling. A case may present two sets of rights, both statutory, which are
incompatible. One set must give way, and frequently individual rights
are viewed as secondary to collective interests. 3 6 This "majority rule" is
the essence of collective bargaining and underlies the whole of American
labor relations. 137
bitration Procedures: Some Modest Proposals, 54 IowA L. REv. 560 (1960); Davey, The
Supreme Court and Arbitration: The Musings of an Arbitrator, 36 NOTRE DAME LAW.
138, 141-45 (1961); Getman, The Debate Over the Caliber of Arbitrators: Judge Hays
and His Critics, 44 IND. LJ. 182, 189 (1969); Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlap-
ping and Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 30,
32-35 (1971); Ascendency of Labor-Arbitration, supra note 95, at 522-30; Note,
The Authority and Obligation of a Labor Arbitrator to Modify or Eliminate a Provision
of a Collective Bargaining Agreement Because in His Opinion It Violates Federal Law,
32 Omio ST. L.J. 395 (1971).
134. 415 U.S. at 56.
135. Id. at 51.
136. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180-82 (1967). In its other
1974 ruling on arbitration, the Court upheld the enforceability of a commercial contract
provision by which the parties agreed to arbitrate differences. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). The opinion in Scherk provides a lengthy discussion of
Wilko v. Swan in which the Court confronted policies contained in two statutes: the
Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970) (avoidance of expensive litigation)
and the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970) (protection of investors and
requirement of full disclosure). 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1970) construing Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427 (1953). In Wilko, the Court refused to enforce the contractual agreement
to arbitrate, on the basis of section 14 of the Securities Act, which voids any waiver
of compliance with the Act.
137. 420 U.S. at 62. The Court's reiteration of this concept in Emporium emerged
from a background of cases in which the Court had underscored the majority rule princi-
ple as the core of the federal labor policy. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
What seems distinguishable about the employment rights in Alex-
ander is the substantial constitutional dimension involved. That these
individual rights of freedom from discrimination bring into view the
fourteenth amendment mandates of equal protection and due process of
law is nowhere discussed in the opinion. Nonetheless, these principles
seem to underlie much of what is said.138
Even though Alexander serves as a milestone in the retrenchment
from deferral to arbitration, the opinion presented little discussion of the
major conceptual problem which the case presented, the reconciliation
of two major labor law policies: promotion of arbitration to solve labor
grievances peacefully and the elimination of discrimination in employ-
ment.139 Analysis of this problem is hardly furthered by Justice Powell's
adamant denial of the district court's premise that allowing the employee
to bring his grievance in both a court proceeding and an arbitration
U.S. 175, 180 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). See
also Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination: The More
Remedies, the Better?, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 32-36 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Melt-
zer]. Meltzer criticizes the circuit court's decision in Emporium, based on the "threat
posed by minority action to several interrelated values central to the NLRA ....
Id. at 32.
For an analysis arguing for the priority of collective interests in a labor union, see
Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. RaV. 601 (1956). "When the in-
terest of several groups conflict, or future needs run contrary to present desires, or when
the individual's claim endangers group interests, the union's function is to resolve the
competition by reaching an accommodation or striking a balance. The process is politi-
cal. It involves a melange of power, numerical strength, mutual aid, reason, prejudice,
and emotion." Id. at 626-27. Compare id. with Schatzki, supra note 11.
138. "[Jludicial construction has proven especially necessary with respect to Title
VII, whose broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public
law concepts." 415 U.S. at 57. See Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 310
F. Supp. 195, 197-98 (W.D. Va. 1969); Professor Meltzer holds the view that "the Con-
stitution does not provide an adequate basis for the disqualification" of a discriminatory
union from NLRB recognition. Meltzer, supra note 137, at 11. Consider, however, the
language of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944): "We think that
the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory representative of a craft at least as
exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members of the craft as the Con-
stitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for
whom it legislates. Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with
powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict
the rights of those whom it represents but it has also imposed on the representative a
corresponding duty." Id. at 202 (citation omitted). For discussion of this concept see
Wellington, supra note 89, at 1334-43, arguing that the labor statutes would be uncon-
stitutional if the union were not construed to have a duty of fair representation.
139. One commentator's remark about the lower courts' treatment of this "policy
fight" is equally applicable to Alexander: "if there has been a struggle between compet-
ing policies, it has been waged only subconsciously." Policy Conflict, supra note 98,
at 101.
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proceeding "gives the employee two strings to his bow when the employ-
er has only one.' 40
The fact is that the approach fostered in Alexander does give the
employee two opportunities to assert his grievance. This scheme is not
inequitable; in fact, Congress intended 141 that Title VII provide added
statutory protection for employees with discrimination grievances, a
particular class of employment grievances which were not being satisfac-
torily resolved. 142
Possible Impact
The actual impact upon the institution of arbitration by Alexander
and Gateway may not be unduly deleterious. Nevertheless the practice of
arbitration is bound to be profoundly affected. Clearly, the decision in
Alexander heralds a tone of national de-emphasis of arbitration.143 For
instance, the very aspects of arbitration 44 which the Court in Alexander
presented as indications of its impropriety for resolution of racial griev-
ances had themselves persuaded the Court of the desirability of arbitra-
tion fifteen years ago in the Steelworkers Trilogy. 45 While arbitrators
and some commentators fear that the decision in Alexander will severely
discourage the use of arbitration, the more probable outcome would
appear that the federal courts and the arbitral process will continue to
serve as alternative forums, just as the NLRB and arbitration have
continued to provide independent forceful remedial systems.146
140. 415 U.S. at 54, quoting 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D. Colo. 1971).
141. "Congress specifically endorsed and encouraged a multiforum, manifold cause
of action approach to eliminate employment discrimination. Therefore, Congress could
not have been concerned with any unfairness involved in successive litigation since such
litigation is inherent, as Congress was aware, in the very approach which it expressly
adopted." Hebert & Reischel, supra note 9, at 470. As to the equity of forcing the
defendant to "defend" himself twice, there is documentation that the burden of multiple
litigation is greatest on the private individual facing the wealthy institutional defendant.
See id. at 470 n.117.
142. For the argument that enactment of Title VII was a response to perceived in-
effectiveness of the doctrine of fair representation in discrimination cases, see Gould,
Racial Equality in Jobs and Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Burger Court, 68
Micr. L. Rav. 237 (1969).
143. This development is not totally unexpected when one considers the unrealistic
expectations the Court had imposed on this method of resolving disputes. This new tone
is evident in Alexander in which the Court had pointed out so many deficiencies in the
process of arbitration as well as in the capabilities of arbitrators that it seems to have
felt a necessity to insist defensively "[tihis is not to suggest, of course, that arbitrators
do not possess a high degree of competence with respect to the vital role in implement-
ing the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes." 415 U.S. at 57, n.18.
144. See text accompanying note 83, supra.
145. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
146. For the view that Alexander will discourage and even threaten the continued
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Gateway and Alexander: Reconcilable Differences
The decisions in Alexander and Gateway are not necessarily in-
compatible. In Gateway, unlike Alexander, a ruling against requiring
arbitration as the contractually provided remedy would have produced
palpable harm: a strike. This distinction is critical to an understand-
ing of the different results in the two cases. Moreover, there is some
merit to Justice Powell's argument in Alexander14 7 that the mere avail-
ability of the added judicial remedy would not act as a discouragement
to arbitration.
There are some rights over which courts simply will not yield their
jurisdiction to an arbitrator, despite both the general desirability of
expanded arbitration and the clear expression in the particular instance
of the parties' intent to be bound by arbitration.148
Nonetheless, the Court in Alexander hedged as to whether its
decision rested upon statutory mandate or upon its own conception of
the importance of the rights at stake. The constitutional rights involved
in Alexander are individual in nature, whereas the safety rights in
Gateway are collective. In a context such as that in Gateway, mutuality
of interest between union and individual member is assumed.14 9 More-
use of arbitration, see Siber, The Gardner-Denver Decision: Does It Put Arbitration
in a Bind?, 25 LAB. L.J. 708, 713-16 (1974). For general criticism of multiple remedies
and of the "more the better idea," see Meltzer, supra note 137, at 45-46. But see Bennett
& Bennett, supra note 9, at 73; Policy Conflict, supra note 98, at 139-41, for the pre-
Alexander argument that a system allowing dual remedies "poses no significant threat
to the continued vitality of the arbitral institution." Id. at 86.
Regardless of the tally on either side of the academic debate, the current situation
remains that the circuits are permitting multiple remedial approaches for the elimination
of the same instance of discrimination in employment. For an important post-Alexan-
der case illustrating this proliferation of remedies, see note 108 & accompanying text
supra.
147. 415 U.S. at 54-55.
148. Child custody cases are a good example of this judicial attitude. The courts
always have the last word in order to protect the best interests of the child. See Sheets
v. Sheets, 22 App. Div. 2d 176, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1st Dept. 1964) (the court will en-
force an agreement to arbitrate disputes over child custody matters, subject to the ab-
solute right of the courts to review for the best interests of the child). "[A]rbitration
awards which may adversely affect the best interests of the child will be disregarded by
the courts whose paternal jurisdiction is paramount. As a consequence, there may in
certain instances be a duplication in effort, where the court decides to look into the mat-
ter de novo and reaches the same or different result." Id. at 180, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
See also Buttenwieser, Foster, Kubie, Moloshok & Reinach, Arbitration and Protection
of the Child, 21 ARB. J. (N.s.) 3 (1966).
149. There is a prevalent assumption of the appropriateness of arbitration in cases
concerning safety hazards. "llt is difficult to believe that the safety of employees or
the present 'power' balance between labor and management will be sacrificed in the
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over, the Court's history of particular concern over racial discrimination
in employment has not been paralleled in the field of safety issues.150
While the majority of the Court apparently did not agree with
Justice Douglas that Gateway involved a matter of life and death, their
treatment of the case indicates that the general issue of the role of
arbitration in safety disputes is far from resolved. Gateway certainly
poses a stumbling block to the next case in which a union wishes to strike
because of a safety hazard, but it is by no means as fatal a decision for
employee safety as it might seem at first.' 5 ' It is true, that as a result of
the case, objective evidence of a danger must be produced. Precisely
what might constitute evidence sufficiently convincing to justify an
employee walkout remains at present undetermined . 52
Many aspects of the deferral question were either not presented by
the facts in Gateway or not definitely resolved in the opinion. It is
arbitration process." Note, Walkouts Under Section 502 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 76
W. VA. L. REv. 57, 67 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Walkouts]. See notes 100-01 supra.
150. Contrast the history of the duty of fair representation, note 11 supra, with the
history of section 502. There have not been many decisions involving section 502 safety
disputes, as the section is a relatively recent discovery. For discussion of these cases,
including Gateway, at the circuit court level, see Walkouts, supra note 149. For another
view suggesting that unions have often been overly cooperative with management in
compromising union safety concerns, see Oldham, supra note 61, at 962-67 & n.108.
151. See Ascendency of Labor-Arbitration, supra note 95, at 521-22; notes 100-01
supra (for cases protecting safety strikers from discharge).
152. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra. The still unsettled question as to
degree of certainty necessary to enjoin an alleged danger has been at the heart of one
of the most prolonged environmental controversies in America, the dispute concerning
Reserve Mining Company's daily discharge of 67,000 tons of industrial waste containing
asbestiform particles into Lake Superior. After a successful but lengthy trial in which
several states and federal agencies sought to enjoin the discharges on the ground that
the particles are carcinogenic, the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court of Minne-
sota. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974) rev'g 380
F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974). The circuit court's refusal to allow the injunction is inter-
esting and disturbing in its implications concerning the sort of certainty that would jus-
tify the enjoining of a large scale health hazard. The court concluded that "[pilaintiffs
have failed to prove that a demonstrable health hazard exists." Id. at 1084. This con-
clusion seems to provide an ominous answer to the question the court deemed the heart
of the case, "what manner of judicial cognizance may be taken of the unknown." Id.
The court's answer to its own question appears to be that no cognizance may be taken.
See CONG. REc. S. 2555-57 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1975).
The circuit sharply rebuked "the district court's determination to resolve all doubts
in favor of health safety [as] represent[ing] a legislative policy judgment, not a judicial
one." Id. at 1084. The central question of degree of proof remains unanswered, and,
if anything, even more puzzling, after the massive presentation of medical evidence of
health hazards in this case was rejected as insufficient. (The district court opinion was
ninety pages long; it followed 139 days of trial, over 100 witnesses, 1,621 exhibits, and
18,000 pages of transcript.) See Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 380 F. Supp. 11,
15 (D. Minn. 1974), rev'd, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974), application to vacate stay
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likely' 53 that the Court will eventually face facts which are less favorable
to management, in which instance the Court might be more willing to
find employees justified in striking on the basis of both a fear for their
lives and a reluctance to entrust the resolution of a life-imperiling hazard
to an arbitrator. Thus, although the record presented in Gateway made
it relatively easy for the Court to uphold the suitability of arbitration, the
projected safety dispute of the future could occasion further retrench-
ment by the Court from its advocacy of arbitration as the cure-all for
labor disputes. The Court's attitude toward arbitration in cases concern-
ing safety hazards may therefore prove to be consistent with the express
curtailment in Alexander of the scope of arbitration in racial grievances
raised under Title VII. The contrasting positions presented in Alexander
and Gateway can be reconciled if not advocated.
order pending appeal denied, 420 U.S. 1000 (1975). The Supreme Court has refused
to vacate the Eighth Circuit's stay. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 420 U.S. 1000
(1975).
But compare Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.
1975) rejecting the challenge of vinyl chloride manufacturers that the Secretary of La-
bor's health and safety regulations concerning workers' exposure to vinyl chloride were
not justified by scientific and medical evidence. The court noted that "the ultimate facts
here in dispute are 'on the frontiers of scientific knowledge', and, though the factual
finger points, it does not conclude." Id. at 1308. Nevertheless, the court treated the
evidence of carcinogenicity as compelling: "[I]t must be remembered that we are deal-
ing here with human lives.... ." Id.
For a narrative account of the Reserve Mining trial itself, see P. BRODEUR, EXPEND-
ABLE AMERICANS 230-38 (1970) [hereinafter cited as BRODEUR]. Brodeur poses the es-
sential rhetorical question raised in the burden of proof issue, namely, whether there
must be "an unusual disaster-a drama of vast magnitude" in order to prove an environ-
mental hazard. Id. at 230. "
Consider the legislation, S.841, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) proposed by Senators
Gaylord Nelson and Philip Hart in response to the Reserve case, to clarify the burden
of proof in environmental health litigation.
Interestingly, despite its ruling refusing to halt the daily discharges, the Eighth Cir-
cuit did order Reserve to take immediate anti-pollution steps within an unspecified "rea-
sonable" time. Judge Myron Bright, the author of the opinion, had noted at the final
arguments the importance of this decision as signifying court action against an environ-
mental health hazard without waiting for "dead bodies in the streets." N.Y. Times,
Mar. 15, 1975, at 30, col. 2.
153. Unquestionably the environmental movement of recent years has had the ef-
fect of creating a general popular awareness and concern for environmental dangers to
people. This concern can be expected to result in increasing labor protests over hazards
in industrial operations. "Increasingly, younger labor leaders realize that most workers
live near their plants in some of the worst urban neighborhoods, and that the very poi-
sons environmentalists hope to remove from the outside community do their greatest
damage inside the blue-collar workplace. For these reasons, the industrial worker stands
to gain more than anyone else from the ecology movement." Udall & Stansbury, Sell-
ing Ecology to the Hard Hats, Washington Post, April 25, 1971, at B-l, col. 1; cf. Walk-
outs, supra note 149, at 57 n.4. See note 155 infra, for statistics revealing the current
hazard to life in present mining operations.
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It is not necessary to disagree with the results of either case in order
to quarrel with their reasoning and to suggest that their conclusory nature
will inject uncertainty into future arbitration litigation for some time to
come. The decision in Gateway is particularly vulnerable to this criti-
cism. The anomalous situation confronting an employee who wishes to
assert both a racial grievance against his union and an occupational
safety grievance suggests a further ground for criticism of the two
decisions. To press his claim against the union, he must satisfy the test in
Vaca by presenting essentially subjective evidence of bad faith on the
part of the union. In addition, to vindicate his safety grievance, he must
satisfy the test in Gateway by offering objective proof of the existence of
a safety hazard.154
The development of increasing environmental awareness' 55 and the
activism which this consciousness has fostered will surely have a sub-
stantial impact on grievance arbitration concerning occupational safety
disputes.'5 0 The judgment in Gateway that arbitration occupies a su-
154. 414 U.S. at 386-87.
155. See, e.g., BRODEUR, supra note 152, for excellent documentation of the growing
awareness of occupational hazards. Reliance for protection from such hazards has been
placed on agency inspection. The inadequacy of inspection and regulation by the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has been the subject of growing
controversy. It is this situation which Brodeur labelled "incontrovertible evidence of the
sorry tangle of ignorance, laxity, and lack of communication that had from the very be-
ginning characterized government policy toward occupational exposure to asbestos." Id.
at 48.
The grim statistics guarantee growing pressure on Congress for more effective reme-
dies: 14,300 workers die each year, and 2.2 million are disabled each year from acci-
dents in the workplace. H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 38 (1970). The
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. sections 651-78 (1970), which
is not applicable to challenges of working conditions in areas in which other federal
agencies exercise statutory authority, has not been properly implemented. BRODEUR, sU-
pra note 152, at 54. See Comment, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational
Safety & Health Act of 1970, 86 HARv. L. Rnv. 988 (1973). Even with the rigourous
standards for mine safety specified in the Coal Mine Safety Act of 1969, 130 miners
were killed in 1974 (132 deaths in 1973); there were 8,611 disabling injuries in 1974
(11,199 in 1973); N.Y. Times, April 3, 1975, at 30, col. 5. The validity of the worker's
assertion of his right to be free from such dangers, whether of immediate effect or not,
will be hard to deny in the face of such continuing statistics. With such recognition,
judicial protection of these rights should be forthcoming. In the recent 1974 UMW
strike, arbitrability of safety matters was a key issue. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1974,
at 13, col. 1.
156. As one commentator concluded: "[It is time to realize that the workers are
genuinely, often predominantly, affected by their employers' pollution outside the plant
as well as inside, and that there is a high degree of interconnection between the internal
and external environments. A handful of unions and employers have recognized these
facts, and others will as well as time passes and environmental conditions worsen." Old-
ham, supra note 61, at 1029.
preme status in occupational safety disputes is thus quite likely to be
modified.
The elevation of a right to be safe on the job to a higher status
would have the effect of opening any arbitration decision concerning a
safety dispute to broader judicial review. The violation of the occupa-
tional safety right might come to be treated as just as serious as an unfair
labor practice. One union has already recommended in a formal position
paper for its local unions that such safety violations be termed "unfair
environmental practice[ s]."' 1
While it is true that the Coal Mine Act did not provide the right the
UMW claimed, the Court in Gateway could have construed section 502
to imply a right not only to refuse to work in hazardous conditions but
also to refuse to submit such disputes to arbitration. Often in the field of
labor law, the particular manner in which a case reaches the Court
is likely to determine its outcome. 15 8 Nevertheless, the Court's de-
votion to the principle of arbitration has often led it astray regardless
of the particular fact pattern by which a new labor issue has been
presented. Indeed, it is possible to view Alexander as the Court's way of
finally correcting the mistake made in Vaca, after prolonged exposure to
how that decision had helped to perpetuate union-employer racial dis-
crimination.
These recent decisions show that the Supreme Court has begun to
take stock of the manner in which the process of grievance arbitration
fits into the general framework of employee rights and collective bar-
gaining procedures. This critical evaluation of the function and scope of
the arbitrator's authority has resulted in some clear limitations of his
power. At the same time, these decisions have confirmed a substantial
area of definitive authority for the arbitrator. The process of clarification
has in turn suggested disturbing policy implications. The forcefulness of
the Court's vindication of individual employees' Title VII rights in
Alexander is matched in tone by the Court's subsequent reassertion in
Emporium of the application of the majority rule principle of union
representation over discrimination grievances. Moreover, the uncertainty
which these two emphatic yet inconsistent decisions engender is aggra-
vated by the ambiguities which characterize the decision in Gateway.
Together, these recent decisions suggest that a definitive legal concept of
the scope of the arbitrator's authority has not yet crystallized.
157. Oldham, supra note 61, at 972 n.133, citing The International Brotherhood of
Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers, Project HI-An Environmental Program for Lo-
cal Unions, June 8, 1971 at 2.
158. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 137, at 43-46.
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